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POLICY CHALLENGE
Without an ambitious deal at the United Nations climate summit in Paris in late
2015, much of EU climate policy will be futile. Climate finance is the most
important tool the EU has to make a deal likely. A strong and unified EU posi-
tion backed by common resources would increase the EU’s ability to shape the
emerging international climate institutions and their governance, to ensure
that climate finance is used to reduce
mitigation costs and to ensure that
European industry benefits from the
opportunities related to climate
finance. A redirection of domestic miti-
gation costs to climate finance and
the crowding-in of private money
would reduce the burden on taxpay-
ers. Dedicated resources, collected
through a revamped emissions trading
system and a carbon tax on transport
and heating fuels, would increase the
predictability and credibility of EU
climate finance.
International climate finance, $ billions
THE ISSUE Combating climate change is perhaps the most formidable public
policy challenge of our times. Unmitigated climate change will be irreversible.
It will place significant costs on future generations, and expose them to
unexplored risks. To mitigate climate change, global coordination is
indispensable. European Union citizens consider climate change a central
problem. The EU and its member states have therefore put in place signficant
and costly climate mitigation policies.
Source: Bruegel based on OECD (2015) and Standing
Committee on Finance (2014).
Global total climate finance
±340-650
All financial flows
from developed countries
±40-175
Flows to developing
countries through public
institutions
±35-50 Other official
flows ±14-15
MDB finance
±15-23
Multilateral
clim. funds 3.4
UNFCCC
funds
1.2
Clim.-related
ODA 26
Relatively
certain
Medium
certainty
Relatively
uncertain
br
ue
ge
lp
ol
ic
yb
ri
ef
02
EUROPEAN CLIMATE FINANCE: SECURING THE BEST RETURN
1. IPCC, AR5, Working
Group I, summary for
policymakers.
2. Ibid, p22.
3. The literature on the
size of migration flows
induced by climate
change is still in its
infancy. Piguet (2012)
has a useful summary.
First evidence that
flows can be a direct
result of climate change
is presented in
Kniveton et al (2012).
4. IPCC, AR5, Working
Group I, summary for
policymakers, p22; an
earlier study is Giorgi
and Lionello (2008).
The European
Commission is funding
a project assessing the
local impact on the
Mediterranean
(http://www.climrun.eu/ ).
5. Ibid, p17. 
6. US National Oceanic
and Atmospheric
Administration ESRL;
http://www.esrl.noaa.go
v/gmd/ccgg/trends/.  
7. ESRL (2015) and
IPCC, AR5, Working
Group III, summary for
policymakers, p7.
8. Projections about
future increases of
temperature are
characterised by
uncertainty. However,
the IPCC establishes an
almost linear
relationship between
ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE –
A GLOBAL CHALLENGE
Climate change is already affect-
ing our environment: Global
average temperatures have risen
by almost 1°C above pre-indus-
trial levels. Sea levels have risen
by 19cm since the beginning of
the last century. The frequency of
extreme weather events has
increased. Water cycles and cer-
tain ecosystems are affected1.
Climate simulations show that
temperature increases will be dif-
ferent in different parts of the
world2. In some vulnerable
regions, more extreme tempera-
tures and desertification could
trigger migration3. The EU might
also be directly affected by sub-
stantial increases in droughts and
extreme heat phenomena in
southern Europe by the end of the
century4.
The scientific consensus is that
this temperature increase is very
likely the result of man-made
emissions of greenhouse gases
(GHG)5. The concentration of CO2
in the atmosphere has increased
by about 2 parts per million (ppm)
per year since 20026, passing
400 ppm in 20157. Baseline pro-
jections suggest that without
mitigation, the average global
temperature could increase by
more than 4°C by the end of the
century8.
Addressing climate change is
arguably imperative for the fol-
lowing main reasons:
1 Ethical: Climate change will hit
the poorest parts of the world’s
population hardest9. It will also
affect future generations much
more than current generations.
Ethical considerations call for
the preservation of the com-
mon good of an intact
environment10.
2 Risk management: climate
change affects a complex sys-
tem that we do not fully
understand. Research has
indicated the possibility of
potential vicious cycles (such
as release of greenhouse
gases from melting per-
mafrost) and threshold events
(such as a shift in the Gulf
Stream). Global warming
remains a large-scale experi-
ment on our planet with
uncertain outcomes.
3 Irreversibility: climate change
is a slow-moving but long-last-
ing phenomenon that humans
cannot easily stop when its
effects turn out to be severe.
Even after a complete stop of
man-made greenhouse-gas
emissions, the stock of green-
house gases in the
atmosphere will continue to
cause global temperature
increases for centuries.
4 Expected economic cost: There
is a consensus that above a
certain temperature level, cli-
mate change will have
significant economic costs –
but there is no consensus on
how big this cost will be11.
Addressing climate change
involves both adaptation and mit-
igation. Adaptation policies to
cope with the consequences of
global warming are primarily car-
ried out by local or national
authorities and do not require
global cooperation. Mitigation is
all policy action aimed at limiting
global warming.
Mitigation is a truly global chal-
lenge because action by
countries acting alone would be
largely ineffective. Reduced fossil
fuel consumption in a few partici-
pating countries would lead to
lower fossil fuel prices. Countries
that opt out would hence increase
their production/exports (of
energy-intensive products)
based on highly competitive fos-
sil fuels, largely off-setting the
greenhouse-gas reductions in
participating countries.
The optimal balance between mit-
igation, adaptation and
endurance is uncertain. In an opti-
mal scenario, the overall costs
related to climate change will be
spread relatively evenly across
all three12.
To achieve the politically-set goal
of limiting global warming to less
than 2°C above pre-industrial
level, global emissions must be
cut drastically. The IPCC (2014)
translates the target into a CO2
concentration of less than
450ppm. Achieving this goal will
essentially require the total
decarbonisation of our
economies in the twenty-first
century.
A low-carbon economy requires a
completely different investment
profile to business-as-usual. First,
most of the cost will be up-front
because the investment cost for
low-carbon technologies tends to
be higher, while variable costs
tend to be lower. According to IEA
(2014), US$53 trillion in cumula-
tive investment in energy supply
and energy efficiency is required
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path (IEA, 2014). Second, many
low-carbon technologies required
for deep decarbonisation are still
in their infancy and require sub-
stantial investment in research,
development and demonstration.
Third, the overall cost of the
energy system will be higher than
under business-as-usual (if one
does not price in the climate
externality). Estimates of the
additional cost of achieving the
2°C target range from a 3 percent
to 11 percent loss of annual con-
sumption in 2100 compared to
the no-mitigation baseline13. The
impact on GDP could also trans-
late into a significant impact on
public finances. Research has
also started to examine the poten-
tial consequences for financial
stability of both decarbonisation
and climate change14.
Most economists argue that
appropriately pricing emissions is
the most efficient way of achiev-
ing de-carbonisation. Pricing
carbon would change consump-
tion, investment and innovation
decisions. Carbon taxes and cap-
and-trade schemes are two ways
of achieving this goal15. It would
be most efficient if this price is
the same for all countries and
sectors. Gollier and Tirole (2015)
suggest that all countries should
agree to a minimum carbon price
because the current system of
countries making individual emis-
sions reduction pledges (Intended
Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions or INDCs) will fall short of
what is needed. They, however,
acknowledge that in this case
transfers will need to be organised
to enable an ambitious deal.
WHAT SHOULD THE EUROPEAN
APPROACH TO CLIMATE FINANCE
BE?
Climate finance – defined as a
financial flow targeted at mitiga-
tion or adaptation in developing
countries – is an important ele-
ment of the ongoing climate
negotiations16.
EU finance ministers have repeat-
edly expressed their commitment
to provide climate finance17. They
have reaffirmed their commit-
ment to scaling up the
BOX 1: EXISTING CLIMATE FINANCE COMMITMENTS
The 1992 Framework convention commits developed countries to “pro-
vide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs
incurred by developing country Parties in complying with their obliga-
tions” and defines a corresponding Financial Mechanism. Currently, one
could define four ‘commitment periods and levels’ for climate finance:
1 At the climate conferences in Copenhagen (2009) and Cancún
(2010), the EU and other developed countries pledged jointly to pro-
vide nearly $30 billion in 'fast start' finance to developing countries in
2010-12 to support immediate action. The EU reportedly provided
€7.34 billion in fast start finance over 2010-12, slightly exceeding the
€7.2 billion pledge made in Copenhagen. This is all public money.
2 At the climate conferences in Copenhagen (2009) and Cancún
(2010), the EU and other developed countries also committed to
mobilise $100 billion a year by 2020. If the EU's share is calculated in
the same way as its share of the fast-start finance (EU: $9.3 billion of
$30 billion), it would amount to around $31 billion per year by 2020
– but so far there is no agreement on the shares of the $100 billion to
be paid by individual donors. In contrast to the fast-start finance that
was limited to public money, the $100 billion includes all mobilised
climate finance, including private money.
3 For the years 2013-19 the decision on long-term finance at the War-
saw COP (2013) “urges” developed countries to ramp-up climate
finance to $100 billion in 2020. The Ecofin Council reported that the
EU and its member states provided €9.6 billion in 2013. Assuming a
linear track towards €31 billion in 2020, this would require a continual
scaling up of climate finance by €3 billion per year.
4 There is no formal commitment for the post-2020 period, but the
COP21 draft text includes several options for climate finance.
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Figure 1: Existing climate finance commitments
Source: Bruegel.
cumulated increases in
greenhouse gases and
global temperatures. See
IPCC, AR5, Working Group
I, summary for
policymakers, p20.
9. See for example
Mendelsohn et al
(2006). 
10. See for example The
Vatican (2015).
11. Most models quoted
by the IPCC did not
simulate a 4°C world.
Most estimates of the
welfare loss associated
with a 3°C warming range
from 1 to 3 percent, but
one study estimates
more than 12 percent.
IPCC, AR5, Working Group
II, p690.
12. Agrawala et al
(2010); without
mitigation, the optimal
adaptation cost will
reach up to 1 percent of
GDP in 2100.
13. If we wait or cannot
use certain technologies
or chose sub-optimal
patterns it will be more.
Source: IPCC, AR5,
Working Group III,
technical summary, p58.
14. See, for example,
Bank of England (2015).
15. See Goulder and
Schein (2013); an
important question is
what the best inter-
temporal profile of a
carbon tax would be
(Sinn 2008).
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16. There are three
major mapping
exercises of the climate
finance landscape.
Buchner et al (2014)
includes flows between
developed countries,
Standing Committee on
Finance (2014) is
closest to the UNFCCC
definition and OECD
(2015) focuses on
official development
assistance. 
17. See the Ecofin
conclusions from
November 2014
(Council of the
European Union, 2014)
and the conclusions
from June 2009
(Council of the
European Union,
2009a), for example.
18. In most member
states citizen consider
it on average as a “very
serious problem”. Only
in the Netherlands, the
UK, Latvia and Estonia
the citizen consider it
on average as a “fairly
serious problem”.
European Commission
(2014, p23).
19. Jakob et al (2015)
warn that, without
appropriately designed
policies and
governance provisions,
sizable climate finance
inflows might induce
harmful effects for
recipients.
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mobilisation of climate finance
from a wide variety of sources,
public and private, bilateral and
multilateral, including “alternative
sources of finance”. Ministers
have also expressed their support
for a number of key elements of
the ongoing negotiations, such as
the role of the Green Climate Fund
(GCF) as one of the vehicles for
climate finance.
EU finance ministers have not yet
agreed on precise commitment
numbers for Paris, in terms of how
public, private resources should
be activated, or the main mecha-
nisms through which climate
finance should be channelled.
Ministers have emphasised the
importance of good governance,
proper implementation and
proper monitoring.
So far the EU is a principal provider
of climate finance. In terms of
pledges to the GCF, to multilateral
development banks and in total
climate-related official develop-
ment assistance (ODA) the EU
represents more than half of the
resources provided by all Annex II
countries, while in terms of
responsibility and capability it rep-
resents fewer than half of all
Annex II countries (historic emis-
sions 41 percent; GDP 38 percent).
There is a European interest in
getting (i) a global climate deal in
Paris; (ii) that entails high mitiga-
tion ambitions; and (iii) involves
the EU in shaping the global cli-
mate-finance architecture. A
single EU position and represen-
tation would increase the
likelihood of these outcomes:
Getting a global climate deal in
Paris
EU citizens in all member states
consider climate change as a seri-
ous problem18. These shared
political preferences, together
with the benefits of a common
approach, justify EU-level energy
and climate policies (such as the
ETS and the Energy Union).
Because effective action to miti-
gate climate change requires a
global approach it is fair to
assume that European citizens
would have a (high) preference
for getting an agreement in Paris.
The 2°C target was reaffirmed by
G7 leaders at the June 2015 sum-
mit in Elmau, Germany. A global
deal will require agreement from
developing countries, some of
which are most interested in pre-
dictable climate-finance flows.
Thus a consistent EU position on
climate finance would be instru-
mental for reaching a deal in
Paris. Backing up past pledges
with taxpayers’ resources and
with a proper strategy for private
funding would increase the EU’s
credibility, while joint EU funding
would provide predictable future
flows.
Promoting high mitigation
ambitions
Mitigating climate change is not
only a preference for EU citizens.
A number of sectors have a com-
petitive advantage in supplying
the tools for the necessary transi-
tion. For those, fast and deep
decarbonisation outside the EU
represents an increasingly inter-
esting export market (see Box 2),
with a global investment potential
of an estimated US$53 from
2014-35 (IEA, 2014). The EU has
promised to reduce its emissions
by 40 percent by 2030, but this in
itself will not trigger sufficient rec-
iprocity from other countries
because the EU's efforts are close
to irrelevant on the global scale –
EU emissions are already less
than 10 percent of global emis-
sions. To promote greater
mitigation ambition among its
partners, climate finance is one of
the EU's main levers (in addition
to capacity building and technol-
ogy transfer). A joint position
Table 1: Criteria for sharing the climate finance burden, and actual
climate finance promised
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Historical emissions, 1850-2012 20% 4% 27% 8% 11% 30%
Current emissions, 2012 9% 2% 15% 8% 28% 39%
GDP in USD, 2012 21% 2% 22% 16% 11% 30%
Climate finance in $ billions
GCF pledges (signed) 3.7 0 - 2 - 0.1
GCF pledges (not signed) 1.1 0 3 0.1 - 0.3
Total OECD climate  ODA, 2013 23.5 1.4 0.3* 10.5 - 0.3
- including Multilateral Development Bank 2 0 0.6 0.8 - -
Source: Bruegel based on: Historical emissions and 2012 emissions: http://cait.wri.org/;
Latest GCF pledges: ‘Status of Pledges and Contributions made to the Green Climate
Fund’ (August 2015); GDP for 2012 in current US$: World Bank; OECD ODA, 2013: Cli-
mate Change: OECD DAC External Development Finance Statistics (*2011).
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accountability and appropriate
mechanisms for review, could be
more easily defended. The EU
could shape the allocation of
funds towards an optimal mix of
mitigation and adaptation. The EU
could also more effectively insist
that public climate finance is
additional and crowds-in private
funding and government funding
in developing countries19.
Moreover, individual EU countries
have too little weight to ensure
that climate funds are also used
to procure the technologies (eg
renewables) and services (eg cli-
mate insurance) that they are
particularly good at providing. A
joint EU representation would
ensure that the EU is fairly repre-
sented in corresponding
discussions.
Moreover, climate finance can
make decarbonisation cheaper
and could save European taxpay-
ers’ money currently used in
domestic deployment. The abate-
ment cost in fast-growing
developing countries can be lower
than in developed countries. For
example, building renewable
energy generation instead of coal
plants in developing countries is
cheaper than replacing existing
gas-fired plants before the end of
their economic lifetime in devel-
oped economies. Table 2 shows
that domestic deployment is
already a significant spending
item, of which parts could be used
more efficiently to achieve mitiga-
tion in developing countries.
An EU climate-finance strategy
must then define the resources
would increase the weight of the
EU in the negotiations, possibly
allowing it to promote higher
ambition. Again, the credibility of
such a position would be
enhanced if underpinned by joint
EU funding.
Shaping the global climate
finance architecture
A unified position and representa-
tion would significantly increase
the EU’s ability to shape the
emerging international climate
institutions and their governance.
Small EU countries have only a
very limited voice in the gover-
nance of international climate
funds such as the GCF. Key Ecofin
goals, such as ensuring that
resources are efficiently and
effectively used, with proper
BOX 2: INDUSTRIAL POLICY
Low-carbon energy technologies are expected to capture an ever-grow-
ing market share of energy-sector investments, which represent about 2
percent of global GDP20. Non-Annex I countries will – because of their
increasing energy demand – be a particularly fast-growing market for
energy-sector investments21. For low-carbon technologies, important
standards (such as those relating to electric vehicle infrastructure) and
system choices (such as which transport fuel to use) are expected to be
decided in the coming decade. Promoting low-carbon technologies in
which the EU has a competitive edge outside Europe might help to estab-
lish European standards and systems globally and thus help reinforce
Europe’s competitive edge. Consequently, financing low-carbon invest-
ments in emerging and developing countries could help the EU to secure
a competitive advantage in growing new, high value-added industries.
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Figure 2: EU28 exports to non-Annex I countries (US$ millions)
Source: Bruegel based on UN Comtrade.
Table 2: Estimates of fiscal and
para-fiscal decarbonisation
measures in the EU (in € bns)
Cl
im
at
e-
re
la
te
d 
OD
A 
20
13
Su
bs
id
ie
s 
to
 d
ep
lo
ym
en
t o
f
lo
w
 c
ar
bo
n 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
20
14
Pu
bl
ic
 lo
w
-c
ar
bo
n 
en
er
gy
RD
&
D 
sp
en
di
ng
 2
01
4
14 32 [10-70] 5
Source: Bruegel. Note: Climate-related ODA
2013 is based on OECD ODA and covers all
ODA with a principal or substantial adapta-
tion or mitigation purpose (includes loans
with >25 percent grant element) Subsidies
to deployment of low-carbon technologies
are based on own estimates of the excess
prices of wind, solar and biomass plants
deployed in 2014 in the EU over expected
electricity costs (key assumptions are a 5
percent discount rate, German electricity
forward prices, German new-built feed-in
tariffs) – brackets with low and high sce-
nario, show the huge uncertainty of this
estimate. Public low-carbon energy RD&D is
based on the corresponding IEA statistics.
20. For the years 2014-
35 according to the IEA
New Policies Scenario.
See IEA (2014), p34.
21. Annual non-OECD
energy investments will
grow twice as fast as
OECD energy
investments between
2015 and 2035 (33
percent vs. 16 percent).
Source: IEA (2014),
pp162-3.
and establish clarity on the mix of
grants/transfers, credit finance
and private-sector leveraging.
GENERATING RESOURCES FOR
EU CLIMATE FINANCE
How could the EU generate
resources for climate finance?
Fiscal resources can, in principle,
come from a large number of dif-
ferent sources and are not
necessarily functionally linked to
the EU’s own mitigation goals.
However, it would be advanta-
geous to link own resources to the
EU’s mitigation efforts.
Two main ways of generating cli-
mate finance are conceivable for
the EU. The first improves the cur-
rent emissions trading system
and allocates a fixed proportion of
the revenues to climate finance.
The second consists of a true EU
own resource, a tax on carbon,
which could be applied to sectors
not covered by the ETS.
Improving the ETS and using
revenues for climate finance?
The ETS currently generates about
€8 billion in annual fiscal rev-
enues for member states; part of
this could be earmarked for cli-
mate finance22. The ETS is a
functioning instrument that
already addresses the distribu-
tion issue between member
states. Its current revision for the
post-2020 period provides an
opportunity to inject new ideas.
Moreover, when decarbonisation
is achieved, the corresponding
fiscal capacity would be automat-
ically phased-out.
Proposals to raise additional cli-
mate finance from the EU ETS
br
ue
ge
lp
ol
ic
yb
ri
ef
06
22. There are about two
billion allowances
issued every year, half
of them for free and half
of them through auc-
tions. At the current
price of about €8 per
allowance this trans-
lates into €8 billion.
23. To restore credibil-
ity and to ensure
long-term commitment
to the ETS, the Euro-
pean Investment Bank
could auction guaran-
tees on the future
emission allowance
price. This will reduce
the risk for low-carbon
investments and
enable stabilisation of
the ETS. For a detailed
proposal see Zachmann
(2013). 
24. We would like to
thank Christian Wald-
hoff of HU Berlin for an
exchange on this mat-
ter and sending his
forthcoming paper,
which includes a
related discussion.
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include committing a portion of
auctioning revenues directly to
the Green Climate Fund. Estab-
lishing such a funding
mechanism would provide a long-
term and sustainable way to
deliver climate-finance commit-
ments. Some legal precedents for
earmarking a share of these rev-
enues for European projects exist.
Currently about 2-3 percent of
allowances are – in the frame-
work of the so-called NER300
programme – sold by the Euro-
pean Investment Bank and
distributed to member states to
support a few low-carbon demon-
stration projects, selected at EU
level. The European Commission
proposal on the ETS reform fore-
sees expanding this approach
after 2020. An Innovation Fund
worth 450 million allowances and
a Modernisation Fund worth 310
million allowances shall provide
funding for dedicated purposes. A
similar structure – an EU ETS
International Climate Action
Reserve – could be designed in
order to provide climate finance.
The current ETS has been of lim-
ited effectiveness but there are
instruments to improve it. Its fun-
damental problem is that private
investors do not believe in the
policy commitment that the
issuance of new allowances will
be gradually phased out. As a
result, the price of allowances has
been too low to effectively
change the private sector’s
investment and consumption pat-
terns. Financial instruments
could make policy commitments
more time-consistent23.
Towards a European carbon tax?
The ETS only covers about half of
the EU's emissions and there is
growing concern about different
carbon pricing in different sectors
(for example, electric vehicles
pay for carbon through the elec-
tricity bill, while combustion-
powered cars do not). Conse-
quently, there are good economic
reasons for also taxing carbon in
heating and transport. Within the
internal market, a harmonised tax
on the carbon content of transport
and heating fuels – possibly
aligned with the ETS – would
improve efficiency and would
also create a level playing field.
Article 192(2) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the EU grants fiscal
authority to the EU if the aim is to
achieve an environmental goal as
set out in Article 191. Such a deci-
sion would require unanimity of
the Council with a special legisla-
tive procedure24. This truly
European tax could provide own
resources to the EU, which could
be functionally linked to the cli-
mate-finance commitments in the
international negotiations.
National budgetary sovereignty
would be safeguarded by the una-
nimity requirement.
Neither the EU nor its global part-
ners have a clear position on to
what degree its current and future
climate finance pledges entail
transfers/grants, credit subsidies
or private-sector investment. This
lack of clarity is also reflected in
the balance sheets of the interna-
tional financial vehicles that have
been created to channel climate
finance. The Green Climate Fund,
according to various UNFCCC deci-
sions, should play a substantial
and increasing role in channelling
climate finance but can only con-
tribute about $1.2 billion per year
currently. For the GCF, EU pledges
amount to 47 percent of the $10
billion (GCF, 2015). In terms of
cost to the European taxpayer,
such differences are meaningful25.
Private financial flows can play an
important part in climate finance.
The largest part of the mitigation
and adaptation costs of trillions of
US$ will be covered by the private
sector. For this investment to hap-
pen, the private sector needs to
have stable framework conditions
and clear signals that the global
strategy will be credibly imple-
mented. The financial system
might need further regulatory ini-
tiatives and different supervisory
structures to provide the neces-
sary amounts of long-term
investment capital. Climate
finance should not simply replace
such funding. On the contrary,
public sector guarantee schemes
and similar initiatives should be
targeted to areas to which the
financial system would not pro-
vide funding. For example, some
countries or sectors might lack
market access. Some projects
might be considered too risky to
fund without a first-loss public
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25. Transfers represent
the largest cost but may
also be the most effec-
tive sweetener to
achieve a global deal. In
turn, loans from public
banks will be most rele-
vant for those countries
that lack proper access
to global capital markets.
Private sector invest-
ments, in turn, involve
little or no public
resources but can be
influenced by regulatory
initiatives.
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guarantee. Public resources will
be most effective in crowding-in
additional private funding if they
are targeted at high-risk projects.
To come to a common and united
EU position, agreement between
member states on sharing the
burden of climate finance is
needed. The sharing of the mitiga-
tion burden (a reduction in
emissions of at least 40 percent
by 2030) is already determined
in the relevant decisions on the
ETS and the non-ETS sectors.
There is no corresponding posi-
tion on the distribution of the
climate-finance burden. Internal
EU discussions on existing cli-
mate finance pledges need to
take into account that some
member states are not committed
under the UNFCCC. For possible
pledges beyond 2020, the EU as a
whole should strive to overcome
the strict definitions of the 1992
UNFCCC. While this would imply
that some non-Annex II member
states would also be committed
to provide some climate finance
(in line with their responsibility
and capabilities) it would reduce
the overall share provided by the
EU. Internal compensation would
need to be discussed.
CONCLUSION
An EU approach to climate negoti-
ations and finance would be
preferable to member states pur-
suing individual climate policies,
because of the greater ability of
the EU to shape the climate
agenda, not least to the benefit of
its industry, and to meet the
expectations of EU citizens. Cli-
mate finance is also a way to
reduce European mitigation
costs. Additional EU resources
could come from ETS auction rev-
enues and an EU carbon tax on
sectors not covered by the ETS.
EU finance ministers also need to
discuss the best ways to crowd-in
private finance. Burden sharing
keys on climate finance within
the EU need to be discussed.
The authors would like to thank Hela
Cheikhrouhou and a number of poli-
cymakers and experts, André Sapir,
Benito Müller and participants at
Bruegel’s research seminar. Augustin
Lagarde and Domenico Favoino pro-
vided excellent research assistance.
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